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Nous analysons, dans cet article, le lien empirique entre les
caractéristiques des emplois ainsi que les conditions macroéconomiques locales et
la forme que prennent les contrats de travail. Nous observons qu'il y a une grande
variété dans la forme des contrats régissant la relation d'emploi et que certains de
ces contrats peuvent être expliqués par le fait que les firmes ajustent la façon de
compenser leurs travailleurs aux caractéristiques des emplois. Nous trouvons
également que l'utilisation de bonis est plus probable lorsque le marché local du
travail est caractérisé par un faible taux de chômage. De plus, il est montré que la
fréquence d'utilisation de bonis par les firmes américaines a augmenté au cours des
15 dernières années.
This paper discusses some recent evidence exploring job characteristics
and labor market conditions upon contract form. We find that there is a great deal of
heterogeneity in observed employment contracts in the US, some of which may be
explained by firms tailoring compensation to job characteristics. We also find some
evidence that the use of bonus pay is more likely to be used in tight labor market, and
that its use has increased over the past 15 years.
Mots Clés : Modèles d'agence, contrats incomplets, rémunération incitative
Keywords : Agency models, incomplete contracts, incentive pay
1 Introduction
This paper explores some of the determinants of compensation form in
the US, and suggest that compensation systems should be viewed as
an integral part of the production process. We also wish to highlight
the diversity in observed systems of pay that is often overlooked when
examining wage trends from a macro-economic perspective.
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A goal of
the work reviewed here is to introduce models that are able to make
predictions upon the form of compensation based upon observed job
characteristics, and illustrate how compensation form may respond to
changes in both the nature of work, and labor market conditions.
The extent to which we are able to relate compensation to job char-
acteristics is very much limited by the data. Fortunately, available data
sets do have some information that we can use in this regard. In this es-
say we use both the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and
the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to explore these issues.
These data are not perfect, but they do provide information on some
quite distinction compensation practices. Table 1 reports the incidence
of pay method by occupation for the NLSY. Workers were asked if in the
current year they received compensation of any of the following types:
1. Hourly: Pay that depends upon the number of hours of work.
2. Salary: Pay by xed period, such as weekly, monthly or yearly.
Hours of work may vary from pay period to pay period, with no
corresponding change in salary.
3. Piece Rate: Payment based upon the number of pieces produced
by the worker. For the PSID, workers are also asked if they are
paid a combination consisting of an hourly rate and a piece rate.
4. Commission: Pay based upon a the some dollar measure of out-
put, such as sales in the last period, typically a sub-category of
salary pay. For the PSID, workers are also asked if they are paid
a combination consisting of a salary and a commission.
5. Bonus: Pay above ones salary or hourly pay that is not contractu-
ally linked to a measure of performance, and hence its level is at
the discretion of the employer.
1
However, there are large number of possible models of compensation, as nicely
outlined in the review of Ritter and Taylor (1997).
1
6. Promotion: Movement to a higher rank, usually, though not al-
ways, associated with greater pay.
2
This list does not exhaust the types of pay that we observe in practice,
though it does move beyond the types of pay that would be considered in
most macro-economic models. In the next section the standard agency
model is briey reviewed. This model, the starting point for the economic
theory of contract, helps us understand the conditions under which a
rm should link measures of performance to pay. However, as Table
1 illustrates, explicit pay for performance contracts are by no means
ubiquitous. In section 3 we explore the limitations of the agency model
in the context of Williamson (1975)'s concept of opportunism.
When the employment relation is \complex", in a way that we make
precise, then pay for performance contracts are incomplete, and hence
workers may engage in inecient opportunistic behavior. A solution to
this problem, discussed in section 4, is to use a \relational contract" that
delays specifying rewards and exact performance expectations until after
the worker has selected eort. Under the appropriate conditions this
provides a solution to the problem of opportunistic behavior. Moreover,
it has the empirical prediction that rms are more likely to use bonus
pay rather than eciency wages when labor markets are tight. We test
and nd some support for this hypothesis. The nal section of the paper
contains concluding remarks.
2 Agency Theory
The agency model begins with a principal who wishes to hire an agent
to carry out a task, usually involving the assets owned by the principal.
3
There are three basic ingredients in such a model:
1. The agent is risk averse.
2. The output of the agent is stochastic function of eort.
3. The agent's eort is imperfectly observable.
For simplicity, assume that the principal is risk neutral, hence given
that the agent is risk averse this implies that she would prefer to receive a
2
See the Data Appendix for the exact question pertaining to pay-for-performance
in the NLSY.
3
See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for a good overview of the agency model. See
also Gibbons (1995) for a more up to date review of this literature.
2
xed income stream that is independent of the project's fortunes. How-
ever, given that eort is not easily observable, this may give rise to moral
hazard: the agent may choose less than the ecient level of eort. The
principal can provide incentives for performance by making the agent's
pay conditional upon the available performance measures.
More formally, suppose that the agent's preferences are given by:
U (w; e) = u (w)   v
e
; (1)
where w is income and e 2 fL;Hg is low or high eort. The utility
for money is assumed to be twice dierentiable, and satisfy u
0
(!) >
0; u
00
(w) < 0 for every w > 0: The disutility for eort satises v
H
> v
L
>
0: The eort of the agent results in a stochastic output denominated
in dollars, y 2 Y  <; as well as a vector of performance measures,
m = fm
1
; ::;m
n
g 2 M: Let f
e
(y;m) denote the joint distribution of y
and m as a function of eort, where it is assumed that f
e
(y;m) > 0 for
all (y;m) 2 Y M.
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Let us further suppose that it is ecient for the
agent to produce a high level of eort (otherwise the problem is trivial),
and that the principal oers a wage contract that is a function of the
observable signals (y;m) ; given by w = c (y;m) :
In this case the principal agent problem is given by:
max
c(;)
Z
(y;m)2YM
(y   c (y;m)) f
H
(y;m)dydm (2)
subject to:
E fU (c (y;m) ; H)g 

U (3)
E fU (c (y;m) ; H)g  E fU (c (y;m) ; L)g (4)
whereE fU (c (y;m) ; e)g =
R
(y;m)2YM
u (c (y;m)) f
H
(y;m)dydm v
e
:
Constraint 3 is the individual rationality constraint that ensures the
agent receives as much as her next best alternative, denoted

U: The
next constraint, 4, is the incentive constraint that ensures that the agent
prefers to work hard rather than to shirk.
Notice that even though the principal cannot directly observe the
actions of the agent, the contract is designed so that in equilibrium the
agent chooses to work hard. Assuming that the solution can be char-
acterize by the rst order conditions for the optimum, then the optimal
4
This is the so called full support assumption that is a necessary (though not
sucient) condition to use the rst-order approach to characterize the optimum. We
also assume that the density is a dierentiable function of y and m:
3
contract solves the following equation:
1
u
0
(c

(y;m))
= + 

1 
f
L
(y;m)
f
H
(y;m)

; (5)
where ,  0 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints
3 and 4 respectively. If there were no moral hazard problem, then 4
would not be binding, and  = 0; with the optimal contract given by a
constant wage w

satisfying u
0
(w

) = 1=:
The interesting case is when moral hazard is a problem, and hence
 > 0: In that case the sensitivity of the contract to y and m depends
upon the behavior of the likelihood ratio r (y;m) =
def
f
L
(y;m)
f
H
(y;m)
: When
the likelihood ratio is a decreasing function of y; called the monotone
likelihood ratio condition, then the optimal contract will be increasing
in y: This condition implies that F
H
rst-order stochastically dominates
F
L
(though the converse is not true). As discussed in detail by Hart
and Holmstrom (1987), the intuition is that a high y signals high eort,
and hence the agent should receive a greater reward. In equilibrium the
principal has correct expectations concerning worker eort, and hence
the signalling eect is to provide ex ante incentives, and does not provide
information to the principal per se. The signalling perspective does
provide guidance on when additional measures of performance should
be incorporated into the optimal contract, as shown in the following
proposition.
5
Proposition 1 Suppose that the solution to the principal agent problem
satises the rst-order condition 5; then the optimal contract c

(y;m)
depends upon the signal m
i
if and only if @r (y;m) =@m
i
6= 0 for some
value (y;m) :
For example if m
i
represent the clothes of the agent or their hairstyle,
and these provide no information concerning their eort then they should
not enter into the optimal contract. However, any other measure, such
as customer complaints, supervisor reports, etc., that provide additional
information concerning performance above and beyond y should be in-
cluded into the optimal contract, even if the contract already depends
upon y:
Consider for example a sales person who is paid on commission. Sales
is a discrete variable that depends upon a number of factors, including
price, buyer preferences, store location etc. Hence a sale may be made
even if a salesperson is rude (for example the buyers had to purchase the
5
See Holmstrom (1982) for more details.
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good immediately and could not do further search). However, rudeness
is likely to aect the probability of a sale in many cases, and hence even
if the sale is consummated the optimal contract would entail a penalty if
the customers report to the manager that the salesperson is rude. The
model predicts that even a single report of rudeness should generate a
negative nancial consequence, and more generally, as Gibbons (1995)
observes, agency theory generically predicts a sensitivity to available
performance measures that we rarely observe in practice.
2.1 Some Evidence
To understand why performance pay contracts are not ubiquitous, we
begin by looking at some of the determinants of performance pay. Even
if agency theory is not a complete model, it still provides important in-
sights into the necessary conditions for the use of a performance measure.
In particular, jobs for which the cost of obtaining good measures are low
should have a higher incidence of performance pay. As we can see from
table 1, we have data from the NLSY concerning the incidence of cer-
tain types of performance pay in the 1988-90 period. Unfortunately no
questions pertaining to the characteristics of the jobs were asked in the
NLSY during the 1988-1990 period. But such questions were asked in
1979 and 1982 that we can use to carry out a preliminary investigation of
the relationship between performance pay and job characteristics. The
relevant question in those years was:
\WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF OPPORTUNI-
TIES THIS JOB OFFERS YOU. (FIRST/NEXT) HOW MUCH OP-
PORTUNITY DOES THIS JOB GIVE YOU (READ CATEGORY)- A
MINIMUM AMOUNT, NOT TOO MUCH, A MODERATE AMOUNT,
QUITE A LOT, OR A MAXIMUM AMOUNT? [CATEGORIES]
1. TO DO A NUMBER OF THINGS (VARIETY).
2. DEAL WITH PEOPLE.
3. FOR INDEPENDENTTHOUGHT ORACTION (AUTONOMY).
4. FRIENDSHIPS.
5. TO DO A JOB FROM BEGINNING TO END (PROBE IF
NECESSARY: THAT IS, THE CHANCE TO DO THE WHOLE JOB)
(COMPLETE TASK)."
Answers are re-coded to 0 if respondents answer either \A MINIMUM
AMOUNT", \NOT TOO MUCH", or \A MODERATE AMOUNT",
while they are re-coded to 1 if respondents answered either one of the
last two possibilities. For each one of 20 occupation cells, we compute the
average of the answers in both the 1979 and the 1982 surveys. We then
merge these averages to each corresponding occupation category for the
5
1988-1990 period. This, of course, is a crude way to proxy the dierent
dimensions of the jobs, but we think that it is not too unreasonable to
think that jobs which are in the same occupation cell share some common
characteristics.
In Table 2 we report the results from a linear probability model of
the incidence of dierent types of performance pay.
6
Given that piece
rate workers are also categorized as wage earners (notice that all workers
are categorized as either wage or salary workers), then we can ask what
job characteristics are associated with the use of piece rates. These
results are reported in the rst two columns, with the second column
correcting for biases that may be introduced due to misclassication of
worker occupation.
7
Notice that requiring workers to perform complete tasks is negatively
related to the use of piece rates. This may suggest that individuals on
straight wages are more likely to be assigned specic tasks, with target
completion dates, and in particular is consistent with our view that a
worker is paid a xed hourly wage does not imply a lack of incentive pay.
Rather, the worker is paid for the time spent on the job, where he or
she is required to achieve a satisfactory level of performance. Relative to
piece rate contracts, tasks with less variety would be easier to monitor
on a day to day basis, hence performance can be measured in terms of
a acceptable/unacceptable, with termination the consequence if there is
unacceptable performance.
The Autonomy variable has positive sign in the commission vs. Fixed
Salary regression, while the complete task variable is negative. Given
that commission workers are rewarded based upon a measure of output,
direct monitoring is less necessary and hence they have more autonomy.
This also implies that those workers who are not paid commissions would
be more closely monitored, a observation that is consistent with the
negative coecient for the Complete Task variable.
Consistent with earlier results by Brown (1990), we nd that Variety
has a negative eect on the likelihood that commission contracts are
used. This result does not follow directly from agency theory that would
predict the use of more, not less performance pay. In the next section we
6
We use a linear probability model rather than a logit or probit because we can
better control for selection eects and misclassication error. The main drawback of
a linear probability model is that it is less ecient, but it is in general more robust
to specication errors that a non-linear model would be. Note also that the standard
errors are adjusted for group eects (see e.g. Moulton (1986)) and that we take into
account possible selection (into occupation) eects. See MacLeod and Parent (1997)
for complete details.
7
To correct for misclassication error, we borrow from Krueger and Summers
(1988).
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outline a model based upon Williamson (1975)'s notion of opportunism,
that may help explain this eect. It is also interesting to observe that
job characteristics have little impact upon the choice to use bonus pay
or not.
If bonus pay is not directly related to job characteristics, then what
is its role? The use of bonus pay is not a prediction of the agency model
because it is not an explicit function of a performance measure, but is
the consequence of some system of subjective performance evaluation.
More generally the data also suggests that for many workers, contracted
performance pay (piece rate or commission) is not always an important
ingredient of compensation, especially when Variety is important, even
though agency theory predicts that even imperfect measures of perfor-
mance should be incorporated into pay. In the next section we discuss
how a model of contract incompleteness based upon a simple complexity
argument can explain both the used of non-contingent pay, and why the
incidence of bonus pay may not depend upon job characteristics.
3 Opportunism and Contract Complexity
What we learn from the agency model is that generically optimal con-
tracts should incorporate all available performance measures. This im-
plies that pay for performance should be the norm rather than the ex-
ception. There is a large body of evidence in the management literature
that emphasizes the dysfunctional attributes of performance pay. For
example, if we were to reward computer programmers based upon the
number of lines of code that they produce, then the likely consequence
is not necessarily high output, but many lines of inecient and error
ridden code.
An immediate response is that lines of code is not an appropriate
measure of output. As the famous study by Kerr (1975) eloquently
illustrates, many organizations and rms have implemented pay for per-
formance systems, only later to discover that they result in dysfunc-
tional behavior from the organization's point of view. Recall that in an
agency model the optimal contract incorporates the incentives for shirk-
ing via the Incentive Compatibility constraint, and thus rms would
never be surprised by worker's behavior ex ante. Kerr's observation
of unexpected, dysfunctional behavior ex post is consistent with Oliver
Williamson (1975)'s notion of \opportunism": self-interest seeking with
guile.
In the context of an agency relationship, we dene guile as behavior
that takes advantage of the incentive system by increasing the agent's
7
payo at the expense of the principals that is not anticipated via the
Incentive Constraint. For example, consider a rm that rewards typists
based upon the measured number of keystrokes per day. This is a clear
pay for performance contract committing the rm to pay that is a simple
function of \output". The diculty with this system, as was discovered
when the system was implemented at one rm, is that one typist discov-
ered that she could increase her income by pressing repeatedly the same
key.
Had the rm anticipated this behavior, it would have made allowance
for additional monitoring to ensure the quality of output. The agency
model explicitly assumes that all possible types of dysfunctional behavior
are anticipated and controlled with the appropriate contract terms and
conditions. Hence the introduction of behavior such as guile necessar-
ily requires the relaxation of the complete contracts assumption, which
in turn requires a fundamental modication of the standard economic
model of decision making.
8
The conceptual starting point is to view contract incompleteness as
arising from the problem of exchanging complex goods, such as labor ser-
vices. A distinguishing feature of a complex good, relative to an exchange
of a simple good or commodity, is that quality is dicult to dene, and
therefore dicult to enforce using a contingent contract enforced by the
threat of a court action. Secondly, both the creation of complex goods
and the formation of contracts to govern their exchange are innovative
activities that do not t easily into the standard agency model.
The problem can be illustrated formally with a simple model of em-
ployment based upon the multi-tasking model of Holmstrom and Mil-
grom (1991):
1. The principle and agent agree on compensation and expectations
for performance (which may include the continuation of a previous
agreement).
2. The state of the world !
t
2 
 is revealed.
3. The agent divides a time endowment of Y among k dierent tasks:
y
t
2 <
K
:
4. The principle pays the agent W
t
.
5. Both principle and agent decide whether to continue the relation-
ship or not.
8
See MacLeod (1997) for a complete discussion of this point.
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The date is denoted by the subscript t, and K is the number of
possible tasks. The twist upon the previous literature concerns the in-
terpretation of the state of nature. Suppose that both the costs and
benets of dierent actions are unknown ex ante; for example a reman
may not know which house will catch re; how dicult it will be to put
out the re; nor is he able to anticipate the set of actions that will need
to be carried out upon entering the burning house. A state space that
incorporates uncertain costs and benets for each of the possible tasks
can be dened as follows:

 =


1
; :::; 
n
	



1
; :::; 
m
		
k
; (6)
where 
k
2


1
; :::; 
n
	
denotes one of n levels of productivity for task
k; while 
k
2


1
; :::; 
m
	
represents one of the m cost levels for task k:
The total benet from an eort choice y
t
is dened by 
T
y
t
(boldface
represents a vector), while the total cost to the worker of producing this
eort is
C (y
t
;) 
K
X
i=1
 

i
y
2
it
   (y
it
) f

: (7)
The function  (y
it
) is 1 if y
it
is positive and zero otherwise.
The benets and costs have been modelled as functions, however it is
explicitly assumed that a measurement system does not exist. Consider
a secretary who carries out a variety of tasks, including typing, answering
the phone, ling, making travel reservations etc. The costs and bene-
ts for these dierent activities vary with the day to day demands of
the oce. For example, several people in the oce may need to go to
the same conference, raising the productivity of allocating time to travel
plans, and resulting in a cutback in typing throughput. On the cost side,
if the conference occurs during a busy period (for example college convo-
cation), then one may have to call several hotels to nd accommodation.
Not only do these costs and benets vary in an independent way from
day to day, it is not clear (to me at least) how one would construct a
measurement system to directly compare the costs and benets of the
dierent actions.
The lack of a measurement system aggregating performance implies
that the contract must explicitly describe each state and specify the ap-
propriate associated action.
9
. This is common in many contracts. For
9
This assumption can be contrasted with the agency approach to compensation
as outlined in Baker (1992) and Holmstrom and Milgrom(1991). This work examines
the optimal way to incorporate imperfect signals of worker performance into the pay
package.
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example the contract for a singer at a concert may explicitly list ac-
ceptable reasons, such as laryngitis, that excuse the individual from
providing the contracted upon services. Formally the contract is a
function c : 
 ! X = <  <
k
; where for each state ! 2 
; the
c(!) = (w (!) ; y (!)) 2 X denes the wage payment and the output
expected from the agent. This assumption diers from the incomplete
contracts literature where it is assumed that such a contract is impossi-
ble, while maintaining the hypothesis that individuals understand all the
possible outcomes and can recontract based on the ex post realization of
the state.
For this model an ecient complete contract, c

(!) = (w(!);y (!)) ;
is the solution to the following program:
y(!) 2 argmax
y
0
y
0
  C (y
0
;) ; subject to: (8)
jyj 
k
X
i=1
y
0
i
= Y , and (9)
w(!) =

U + C (y (!) ;) : (10)
where

U is the one period alternative utility for the worker. Following
Townsend (1979) and Dye (1985) suppose that there is a cost for includ-
ing additional contract contingencies, given by  per contingency. For
this multi-tasking model one has the following result.
Proposition 2 The cost of implementing the complete contract proce-
dure when all states occur with positive probability is n
k
m
k
:
What is important to observe is that the cost of the contract is an
exponential function of the number of tasks. The literature on com-
putational complexity emphasizes the impossibility of implementing al-
gorithms whose costs are exponential in the size of the problem (see
Garey and Johnson (1979)). To see why this is the case suppose that
 = 1 cent, and that the number of cost and performance levels are the
same (n = m). Table 3 presents the costs of the complete contract as a
function of the number of tasks and eort levels.
As one can see, the use of a complete contract when there are more
than say 10 tasks is impossible. Furthermore, given that these costs re-
ect the number of underlying states, dynamic programing is impossible
because one could not compute the expected value of the relationship.
Observe that piece rate contracts correspond to basing compensation on
one dimension of output. In this simple setup complete contracts are
very inexpensive; hence they should be observed when the number of
tasks to be measured is small.
10
Number of Cost and Number of Tasks
Performance Levels 2 5 10 15
2 $0.16 $10 $10,000 $10 million
3 $0.81 $600 $35 million $2 trillion
4 $2.56 $10,000 $11 billion $11,000 trillion
5 $6.25 $100,000 $1000 billion $10 million trillion
Cost of a contract clause: 1 cent
Table 3: Cost of a Complete State Contingent Contract
A solution to the problem of complexity is to use an ex post eval-
uation of the employee based upon supervisor reports. However, the
subjective nature of these reports make third party enforcement impos-
sible, and hence performance depends upon what Macneil (1974) calls a
relational contract, discussed in more detail in the next section. Given
that direct supervision of the employee is an essential ingredient of the
relational contract then, not only should workers in such contracts have
less autonomy, but they should also have well dened goals set by their
supervisors.
4 Relational Contracts
When an explicit contract is not possible, then the rm must rely upon
some form of ex post incentive to ensure performance. There are essen-
tially three types of non-contracted ex post rewards that we observe in
the NLSY:
1. Termination contracts - pay the worker a xed salary, and re the
worker at the end of the period if performance is not satisfactory.
2. Bonus contract - pay the worker a discretionary bonus at the end
of the period that depends on performance.
3. Deferred compensation - reward the worker with a promotion or
permanent wage increase.
Bonus pay and deferred compensation are not perfect substitutes
since a promotion entails a permanent increase in income. However,
given that we are using only indicators rather than levels, we have coded
bonuses and deferred compensation into the same category. This reduces
the error associated with imputing the true value of the promotion. Be-
tween 10%-14% of the individuals in our data set receive some form of
11
bonus pay (as opposed to piece rates or commissions which are forms of
complete contingent contract with no ex post evaluation).
10
The theory
developed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) makes some predictions
concerning the eect of market alternatives for workers upon the inci-
dence of bonus pay that we briey outline here.
Suppose the employment contract is given by c = fw; bg ; where
w is a xed wage that is paid at the end of the period regardless of
performance, and b  0 is a discretionary bonus payment that depends
on the rm's subjective ex post evaluation of performance. Given this
contract, individual utility and rm prots are given by:
U (c) = w + b  ve+ U
c
; (11)
 (c) = e  w   b+ 
c
; (12)
where e 2 f0; 1g is a non-contractible eort choice taken by the worker,
U
c
and 
c
are the utility and prot respectively from continuing the re-
lationship. The parameters v and  are respectively the cost and benet
of one unit of eort.
The implicit agreement between the rm and worker requires the
rm to pay the bonus if and only if the worker selects the high level of
eort.
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Should either party shirk, then the relationship is terminated
immediately. Letting

U and

 denote the market alternatives for the
worker and the rm then a contract is self-enforcing if and only the
following incentive conditions are satised:

 
U
c
 

U

 v   b; (13)

 

c
 



 b: (14)
Notice that it is necessary to pay a bonus only if 
 
U
c
 

U

< v:
For example if unemployment rates for the worker were to increase, this
would lower

U; and increase the likelihood that 
 
U
c
 

U

 v: In this
case the threat of termination alone provides sucient incentives for the
worker not to shirk. Conversely, with a tight labor market, when the
worker can always nd alternative work easily, the incentive constraints
imply that some form of end of the period bonus must be paid. Therefore
we expect the incidence of bonus pay to be a decreasing function of the
worker's unemployment rate.
10
Some individuals in the NLSY data receive both piece rates and bonuses. How-
ever they are a small fraction of our sample and so we do not explicitly consider this
case.
11
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) prove that there is no loss of generality when
contracts are restricted to take this form.
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In Table 4 we present some evidence of this eect using the Panel
Study on Income Dynamics. Here we explore the eect of both the local
and industry unemployment rates upon the amount of bonus pay. Table
5 shows the same relationship regarding the incidence of bonuses/promotions
in the NLSY. One explanation for the incidence/amount of bonus pay is
as a form of prot sharing between the rm and the worker. Since rm
prots are likely to be more correlated with industry rather than local
unemployment rates, then if such an explanation were correct it implies
that bonus pay incidence should increase with a decrease in the industry
unemployment rate, while the local rate would be unimportant. The
self-enforcing contract model makes the opposite prediction.
As we can see from the regression results, the industry rate is not
signicant, while the local unemployment rate has a negative impact
upon the amount and the incidence of bonus pay. Also, as we would
expect, this eect is stronger when we restrict analysis to urban areas
where workers would have better market alternatives. More surprising
for us, is the fact that the local labor market eect increases in the PSID
data set when we add controls for time varying industry eects. If bonus
pay were the result of prot sharing, then the addition of such controls
would make the eect of local unemployment either small or less precise,
whereas we observe exactly the opposite.
In this model we have assumed that the supervisor can perfectly ob-
serve performance ex post. We could add imperfect observability, as in
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), and obtain the same result. It is sometimes
believed that it is imperfect observability that generates an eciency
wage. However, as the results of Holmstrom (1982) demonstrate, an
imperfect but contractible measure of output would completely elimi-
nate the equilibrium unemployment result for a standard eciency wage
model. Hence the use of bonus pay and/or eciency wages are a conse-
quence of increases in job complexity that make it impossible to ex ante
fully specify an employer's performance expectations.
Hence our results more generally provide some support for eciency
wage type models. In the absence of bonus pay, an eciency wage model
implies that the wage must be above market clearing, and hence if un-
employment falls this may lead to an increase in ination. Recently, the
economy has appeared to have both low ination and low unemploy-
ment. This could occur if rms moved towards a system of bonus pay,
rather than raise wages. In gure 1 we illustrate the trend in the inci-
dence of bonus pay, ination and unemployment from 1976 until 1991.
While this is not a test, it does show a denite upward trend in the use
of bonus pay over this period.
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5 Conclusions
In this essay we have reviewed some preliminary evidence relating job
characteristics to the form of compensation. Our main message is that
we observe a variety of compensation systems used in practice, the form
of which depends upon job characteristics. Hence there is no single eco-
nomic model of contract formation that can explain the data. Rather
the data suggests that compensation systems depend on explicit perfor-
mance measures when these accurately measure the contribution of work.
In complex environments, rms must depend upon subjective measures
of performance associated with ex post rewards to the worker.
We have also presented evidence showing that the amount of bonus
pay is depend upon the state of the local labor market. One benet of
bonus pay is that its level can be adjusted easily from year to year in
response to business cycle uctuations, which as Weitzman (1985) has
argued, can result in both low unemployment and low ination. Hence
the recent trend increase in the use of bonus pay may be one reason why
ination has not increased, even though the US is also experiencing low
unemployment.
At the moment we do not know if this trend is the consequence of
secular changes in the nature of work, or the result of innovative activity
on the part of the rm. Given that the form of compensation is likely
to aect the responsiveness of incomes to ination and business cycle
uctuations, it is important to better understand the reasons for these
changes. We can conclude that it is an oversimplication to view wages
formation as the simply consequence of supply and demand forces, and
that better understanding the source of variation in pay systems may
have important implications for the nature of monetary policy, a question
we hope to explore in future work.
6 Data Appendix
6.1 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1988-
1990)
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data set surveyed 12,686
young males and females who were between the age of 14 and 21 in
1979. In 1988, 1989, and 1990, respondents were asked whether all or
part of their earnings were based on job performance. They were also
asked a few questions on their work environment. For instance, we know
if the respondents were supervising other employees and whether they
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had received a promotion since the last interview. Unfortunately, we
do not know the precise dollar amounts of incentive pay received by
workers nor do we know the proportion of their earnings which is due to
pay-for-performance.
The question pertaining to pay-for-performance is the following:
\THE EARNINGS ON SOME JOBS ARE BASED ALL OR IN
PART ON HOW A PERSON
PERFORMS THE JOB (HAND CARD D). ON THIS CARD ARE
SOME EXAMPLES OF EARNINGS
THAT ARE BASED ON JOB PERFORMANCE. PLEASE TELL
ME IF ANY OF THE EARNINGS ON
YOUR JOB (ARE/WERE) BASED ON ANY OF THESE TYPES
OF COMPENSATION. PLEASE DO
NOT INCLUDE PROFIT SHARING OR EMPLOYEE STOCK PUR-
CHASE PLANS.
1. PIECE RATES.
2. COMMISSIONS.
3. BONUSES (BASED ON JOB PERFORMANCE).
4. STOCK OPTIONS.
5. TIPS.
6. OTHER."
They were also asked whether they had received a promotion on
their current/most recent job since the last interview. We restrict the
sample to individuals who were in the labor market on a full-time basis.
The people who were considered as meeting that criterion were (i) those
whose primary activity was either working full-time, on a temporary
lay-o or looking actively for a job, (ii) those who had worked at least
half the year since the last interview and who were working at least 20
hours per week. Individuals excluded from the sample are those who
have been in the military at any time, the self-employed and all public
sector employees. These restrictions leave us with an unbalanced sample
of 8,165 observations (3,847 workers), of which 3,832 are paid either a
salary or a salary and a bonus.
6.2 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-
1991)
The sample consists of white male heads of households aged 18 to 64
with positive earnings for the period spanning the years 1976-1991.
12
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In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor
earnings, bonuses/commissions/overtime income, and overtime hours, are asked at
the year t+1 interview. Thus we actually use data covering interview years 1976-1992.
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Individuals in the public sector and who worked less than 500 hours are
excluded from the analysis. We know whether each worker is paid a
piece rate, a commission, an hourly rate or a salary. One interesting
feature of the PSID for the 1976-1991 period is the fact that we are able
to determine whether a worker received a bonus over the last year. In
the PSID questionnaire, workers are asked the amount of money they
received from either working overtime, or from commissions, or from
bonuses paid by the employer. Given that workers report either their
number of overtime hours worked (or simply that they worked overtime)
as well as the hourly rate for overtime, we are able to compute an esti-
mate of the amounts paid in bonuses.
13
6.2.1 COMPUTATION OF BONUSES FROM PSID DATA.
Variables V5285, V5784, V6393, V6983, V7575, V8267, V8875, V10258,
V11399, V12798, V13900, V14915, V16415, V17831, V19131, and V20431:
"HEAD'S INCOME FROMBONUSES, OVERTIME, AND/OR COM-
MISSIONS".
Note that starting with interview year 1986, the codebook species
that the values for this variable represent any extra bonus, overtime
and commissions income not included in Head's income from wages and
salaries in preceding calendar year. Thus, it is possible that some work-
ers who actually received a bonus from their employer do not report it
separately from their \usual" income.
Variables V5419, V5906, V6517, V7120, V7743, V8405, V9036, V10563:
\Did you work any overtime which isn't reported in [average hours
per week worked last year]?"
Variables V11142, V12541, V13741, V14831, V16331, V17740, V19044,
V20340:
\The values for this variable [...] represent the annual overtime hours
worked on all main jobs, if reported separately from regular work hours."
Variables V4515, V5426, V5913, V6524, V7127, V7720, V8388, V9019,
V10468, V11659, V13062, V14162, V15170, V16671, V18109, V19409:
\How is that?-NEITHER SALARIED NOR PAID HOURLY"
This question refers to the method of pay in the case where the
respondent is paid neither a straight salary nor an hourly rate. From
this question, we can identify those workers paid commissions or a base
salary plus commissions.
13
Since we cannot separately identify the amount of income derived exclusively
from commissions, we have to remove these workers from the calculations.
Note that removing all negative estimates of the bonuses probably biases the
mean bonus paid upward.
16
Variables V10465, V11656, V13059, V14159, V15167, V16668, V18106,
V19406:
This is the overtime hourly rate for salaried workers.
Variables V10467, V11658, V13061, V14161, V15169, V16670, V18108,
V19408:
This is the overtime hourly rate for hourly paid workers.
Variables V10469, V11660, V13063, V14163, V15171, V16672, V18110,
V19410:
This is the overtime hourly rate for workers not paid either a salary
or an hourly rate.
Since no information on overtime hours is available before 1984, we
cannot compute an estimate of overtime income for the years 1976-83.
Thus, we simply delete from the sample all workers who report working
overtime between 1976 and 1983 and those who report positive hours
of overtime work between 1984 and 1991.
14
We also delete commission
workers.
It is worth repeating that we are likely to end up with a noisy measure
of bonuses paid. The reason is that the questions on overtime are not
clear cut in the sense that workers are NOT being asked to report any
overtime activity during the previous calendar year. Instead, they are
asked to report all overtime work not already included in the usual hours
per week worked.
6.2.2 MEASURES OF LOCAL LABOR MARKET CONDI-
TIONS
From the beginning of the PSID to interview year 1989, questionnaires
were sent each year to state employment oces asking about current
labor market conditions in these counties. Specically, the unemploy-
ment rate measure refers to a specic period during the corresponding
interview year. For interview year 1976, the reference month is August;
for interview year 1977-1979, it is November; for interview years 1981
and 1983, it is December, while for interview years, 1982, 1984-1988, it
is September.
Starting with interview year 1990, they replaced the variables about
availability of unskilled jobs and unemployment rates with the average
annual unemployment rates for the respondents' counties of residence at
the time of the interview, for the calendar year prior to the interview.
These come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unem-
14
Restricting the sample to 1984-1991 and using the amount earned in overtime to
compute bonuses does not change the results, apart from the standard errors.
17
ployment Statistics Program. The industry (1 digit) level unemployment
rate series also comes from the BLS.
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Table 4
Tobit Analysis of Determinants of Bonus Pay
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1984-1991) $1979
(Standard Errors in Parenthesis)
Variable All Observations SMSA Workers Only
Local Unemployment Rate -360,47 -357,2 -525,37 -570,49 -542,78 -893,73
(76.97) (76.83) (75.41) (158.22) (157.94) (152.61)
Industry Unemployment Rate -91,36 -125,58 - -396,76 -36,86 -
(1-Digit) (328.33) (77.96) (598.02) (133.36)
Schooling 186,98 200,69 -47,69 242,25 277,29 -6,64
(66.65) (66.63) (56.34) (107,46) (107.66) (92.18)
Union -1920,59 -2059,63 -1869,24 -2165,24 -2408,64 -2258,56
(554.94) (548.56) (559.72) (982,56) (970.28) (995.49)
Potential Experience -10,73 -11,6 -52,79 38,8 39,57 -9,38
(20.80) (20.52) (20.21) (35.39) (35.46) (34.29)
Tenure 14,63 15,63 30,94 26,38 30,67 40,91
(26,12) (25.69) (26.20) (44.00) (43.00) (44.16)
Live in a SMSA 571,09 657,22 347,53 - - -
(345.38) (344.84) (103.79)
Industry Dummies Yes No Yes* Yes No Yes*
Log Likelihood -14116 -14124,2 -14113,6 -7724 -7733,5 -7721,6
N 10217 10217 10217 5119 5119 5119
Notes. Workers paid commissions are excluded from the analysis. Additional 
regressors include time and occupation dummies, as well as a dummy for being married.
*A full set of Year X Industry (one-digit) dummies.
Bonus/Promotion vs. Bonus/Promotion vs.
Termination Termination
Variable Contract Contract
(Bonus=1) (Bonus=1)
(Salaried workers only) (All non-commission workers) 
Autonomy 0,982 0,5743
(0.9165) (0.8136)
Complete Task 0,3077 0,0397
(0.9044) (0.8621)
Variety -1,1146 -0,793
(0.7175) (0.6839)
Friendships -0,3302 0,4767
(1.2908) (1.2377)
Deal with People 0,1426 0,4306
(0.2593) (0.2472)
Unemployment Rate -0,0774 -0,0321
in Local Labor Market (0.0161) (0.0159)
Unemployment Rate -0,0299 0,0123
in Industry (0.0225) (0.0213)
Schooling -0,0104 0,0134
(0.0316) (0.0206)
Union -0.0807 0,0092
(0.0336) (0.0264)
Sample Size 3832 7682
Notes. Standard errors are in parenthesis. These are adjusted for structural 
group effects where applicable. Other covariates include tenure, labor 
market experience, and dummies for region, industry, year, residence in smsa,
and increase in responsibility. 
Table 5
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Evolution of Bonus Incidence in the US
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